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Abstract 
Unemployment durations are determined by a number of factors. According to mainstream 
economics theory, unemployment durations are shorter in a more flexible labour market. In 
this paper, we hypothesize that workers who had a temporary contract before the spell of 
unemployment will experience shorter spells of unemployment than workers who had a 
permanent contract before. We adopt a flexible hazard rate model with a nonparametric 
baseline to analyse data on unemployment spells in Germany and Great Britain for the period 
1991-2001. The two datasets allow for an international comparison of the institutional 
differences between the two countries. We find no evidence of shorter unemployment spells 
for previous temporary workers neither in Great-Britain nor in Germany. Results suggest that 
a labour market policy of promoting temporary work will not necessarily lead to lower 
unemployment since these policies increase the probability of becoming unemployed without 
being able to fulfil the promise of shorter unemployment spells. 
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Introduction 
Flexibilisation of the labour market has been at the forefront of the labour market policy 
debate during the whole of the 1990s. One example of such flexibilisation is the rise in the 
number of temporary jobs, especially in Europe. More temporary jobs add to flexibilisation of 
the labour market as a whole, but also generate a source of insecurity, in particular an 
increased risk of unemployment for the workers on these temporary jobs.  
In this paper we investigate the determinants of unemployment spell durations for individual 
workers that are more prone to have ‘flexible careers’, that is, they are more likely to have 
temporary jobs more often. Unemployment spells start when workers are laid off, made 
redundant or when there temporary contract ends. Temporary workers have an inherently 
larger probability of unemployment and because temporary work has become more 
widespread in most countries it is interesting to look at the duration of unemployment spells 
for former temporary workers and see whether they differ in length from unemployment 
spells of workers that were laid off or made redundant. Earlier studies on the impact of 
temporary work on unemployment duration have found the introduction of fixed term 
contracts in Spain to reduce unemployment duration by increasing the hazard rate out of 
unemployment into employment (Bover et al, 2002). Similar effects were found for the 
Netherlands (Zijl et al, 2004). In a study in which unemployment duration for previous 
permanent and temporary workers was compared using French data, it was found that 
temporary workers had higher exit probabilities out of unemployment (Van den Berg & Van 
der Klaauw, 2001). Temporary workers are inherently more prone to experience spells of 
unemployment. When their unemployment spells are longer than or equal to spell lengths 
after permanent jobs this would not only result in lower job-stability but also to higher income 
loss (if we assume that wages for both types of workers are equally high). 
From a neoclassical labour economics perspective, increased contractual flexibility is a policy 
option that will foster employment growth and reduce unemployment. This might actually 
work if temporary workers are prone to make transitions to permanent employment or 
experience shorter spells of unemployment (or both).  
There is a vast body of literature on the subject of unemployment duration and the impact of 
various personal characteristics on it (e.g. Nickell, 1979; Lancaster & Nickell, 1980). Most 
work has focused on the transition from unemployment into full-time permanent employment 
(e.g. Narendranathan & Stewart, 1993; Arulampalam & Stewart, 1995). Given the recent 
growth in the number of temporary and part-time jobs these studies are missing an ever-
growing part of highly relevant labour market transitions. 
Another major field of research involves the impact of unemployment insurance schemes on 
unemployment duration (e.g. Nickell, 1979, Atkinson et al., 1984). Both the impact of the 
benefit-level as that of the benefit-duration has been thoroughly examined. The 
aforementioned studies focus primarily on the level where others focus on duration (e.g. Katz 
& Meyer, 1990). 
Finally, more recent research pays attention to the relationship between the duration of 
unemployment and the probability of finding a job. (e.g. Van den Berg  & Van Ours, 1994, 
1996, Bover et al, 2002, Roed & Zhang, 2003) Duration dependence can be both positive, 
when workers increase their search effort when faced with the expiration of their benefit 
entitlement and negative through stigmatization or the ‘discouraged worker’ effect for long 
term unemployed. 
Temporary jobs and the job search framework 
Temporary work (fixed term contracts, seasonal or occasional jobs) poses a theoretical 
challenge when we want to incorporate it into the job search framework in two ways. Firstly, 
temporary workers are more likely to become unemployed but they already are aware of that 
when they start the job.  
This is a problem when we want to incorporate temporary, fixed term employment in the job 
search framework. As argued above one of the basic assumptions of the job search framework 
is that the termination of employment spells is stochastically determined. So we no longer 
have to model the duration of a job spell, it is already given.  
The ‘advance notice’ approach 
One way to incorporate these considerations into the job search framework is offered by the 
literature on ‘advance notice’ (Addison & Portugal, 1987, Swaim & Podgursky, 1990, 
Addison & Blackburn, 1995, 1997).The basic idea is that workers that were given advance 
notice or advance information on their layoff have the possibility to engage in increased levels 
of on the job search before the actual layoff takes place. Swaim & Podgursky (1990) 
recognised this and present a ‘sequential-regimes’ job search model in which they explicitly 
model two stages of job search, one before job loss and one after job loss. In a sense, a fixed 
term contract comes with an advance notice from the very beginning, more so when prospects 
for permanent employment with the same employer are bad. When hired for a six-month 
contract, you immediately receive six months notice. Applying the framework proposed by 
Swaim & Podgursky this would theoretically result in shorter spells of unemployment after 
the contract than for workers who worked on a permanent contract and were laid off without 
advance notice or information. So, a hypothesis to test would be that workers that had a 
temporary contract would experience a shorter spell of unemployment compared to other 
workers. 
The ‘limited duration’ approach 
Another option is to look at the literature on limited duration of unemployment benefits (e.g. 
Katz & Meyer, 1990). Katz & Meyer (1990) model the hazard rate from unemployment using 
the potential duration of the benefit, the time until exhaustion of the benefits, the level of 
benefits and a vector of individual and labour market variables that affect different aspects of 
the job search process (arrival rate, search intensity, reservation wage). Their results using the 
Mortensen (1977) model indicate that an increase in the potential duration of the benefit has 
two opposing effects on the hazard rate from unemployment. On the one hand it raises the 
value of remaining unemployed, on the other it also raises the value of being employed by 
raising the utility associated with being laid off in the future. Typically, a longer benefit 
period is associated with a lower initial hazard rate, whereas the hazard rate is higher just 
before and after exhaustion for the longer benefit period. (see Figure 1) 
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FIGURE 1 (SOURCE: KATZ & MEYER, 1990) 
When we extend this approach to fixed term (or other temporary) employment we expect to 
find lower initial reemployment hazard for on the job search for workers on temporary 
contracts of longer duration and a higher reemployment hazard just before and after the longer 
contract has ended.  
On the other hand we must realise that longer tenure in a temporary job will normally entitle 
the worker to longer duration of benefits. So the total result on unemployment duration of 
longer tenure in a temporary job is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. 
Furthermore we want to investigate more long-lasting effects of temporary jobs in this paper. 
Workers who have had temporary contracts might be more able to find a job quickly because 
they are faced more often with the gloomy prospect of unemployment. Their ‘flexible careers’ 
make them more proficient in finding jobs when unemployed, at least theoretically. 
An empirical model of unemployment duration 
The job search framework has been widely used in the empirical analysis of unemployment 
duration. The duration of unemployment is modelled by specifying the conditional probability 
of leaving unemployment (e.g. Lancaster, 1990). The hazard is the product of two 
probabilities: the probability of receiving a job offer and the probability of accepting the job 
offer. Furthermore we can assume some duration dependence by means of specifying a 
‘baseline hazard’. The Weibull specification is often used but it has been rejected on several 
occasions (Han & Hausman, 1990, Narendranathan & Stewart, 1993) for being too restrictive 
and not providing an adequate representation of empirical hazard rates, because it only allows 
for hazard rates that monotonically increase or decrease with duration.  
A truly flexible specification of the baseline hazard rate allows for non-monotonic variation 
with duration, and therefore a wider range of possible effects of duration on the hazard rate 
are captured. This is important if non-stationarities, such as running out of unemployment 
benefits, exist in some element of the job search environment. 
  
When we want to incorporate this notion in the hazard function a discrete time hazard rate for 
person i in the time interval j to leave a certain state would look the following: 
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where is a set of individual characteristics, β is a vector of coefficients and φ(t) is some 
functional form of how the duration of the spell affects the hazard rate. It is assumed that for 
each time interval there is a specific parameter that is constant over that period (Prentice and 
Gloeckler, 1978). In other words, the specification of the baseline hazard if fully flexible by 
ijx
allowing it to be constant in each time period with an interval specific parameter φ (t). This 
parameter can be interpreted as the logarithm of the integral of the baseline hazard over the 
relevant time interval. 
The extension of the standard single risk model to two or more independent exit destinations 
is referred to in the statistics literature as an independent competing risks model, where the 
log-likelihood can be split into the sum of its risk-specific hazards (Lancaster, 1990).  
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In such a model observations which exit to a different destination are treated as censored. In 
this paper the main focus is on what happens before the unemployment spell. Competing risks 
models are estimated separately for exit routes ‘employment’ and ‘inactivity’ to check for 
robustness. 
In principle, this model could be extended to allow for unobserved heterogeneity. However it 
has been established that adding a (possibly misspecified) unobserved heterogeneity term 
could possibly introduce more serious distortions than those caused by ignoring unobserved 
heterogeneity (Narendranathan & Stewart, 1993; Arulampalam & Stewart, 1995; Böheim & 
Taylor, 2000). Therefore in this paper we abstract from unobserved heterogeneity in our main 
specification. So we implicitly assume that our covariates capture all individual heterogeneity 
and check for the robustness of that assumption by estimating the specification with 
unobserved heterogeneity whenever computationally feasible.  
Data and variables 
The data used in the analysis consist of information from household panel data surveys for 
Great Britain (British Household Panel Survey) and Germany (German Socio-Economic 
Panel). For both panels the waves from the years 1991 to 2001 are used. In this paper we use 
a sub sample of both panels consisting of spells of unemployment which are completed, 
started after the interview date of the first year of analysis (1991) and can be combined with 
sufficient information on the individuals experiencing the spells.  
The covariates used to explain the hazard rate out of unemployment consist of three groups of 
variables:  
• Individual characteristics (age, marital status, education, non-native) 
• Household characteristics (children present, other household income) 
• Labour history variables (temporary, permanent work in last three years, unemployment 
in last three years, temporary work directly prior to unemployment, duration of 
employment spell directly prior to unemployment) 
To capture the institutional differences between Germany and Great Britain we explain 
differences in outcomes by referring to the qualitative account of the institutions and their 
development in both countries. 
Descriptive statistics 
In this paragraph descriptive statistics are presented on both the percentage of temporary 
employees, the transition rates of these employees to other labour market states the next year 
and on the duration of unemployment spells, both after temporary jobs, and permanent jobs. 
Temporary jobs 
First of all we look at the share of employees that work on a non-permanent contract. For 
Britain we see that the relative number of employees on seasonal or fixed term temporary 
contract has increased from an already high percentage until a serious drop in 1998. This is 
probably due to a tightening of the labour market. Similar drops in the number of employees 
have been found for the Netherlands (OSA, 2000). It should be noted however that these 
numbers are substantially higher than the numbers produced on the basis of the Labour Force 
Survey for Great-Britain (Dekker, 2000).  
For Germany the numbers are quite different. The percentage of temporary employees was 
very low in the beginning of the decade and increased to British levels over the course of the 
1990s. The sharp increase from 1994 to 1995 in the percentage of temporary employees 
suggests that there has been a change in definition of a temporary job (or the routing) in the 
questionnaire.  In 1998 a consolidation of the high level can be observed. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Transitions 
The percentage of workers on temporary jobs and its development over the years does not 
provide information about what happens to individual workers after the temporary job. Do 
they find permanent jobs? Do they end up in unemployment? Or do they withdraw from the 
labour market altogether? 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
From the transition tables we learn that the chances of unemployment after a temporary job 
are much higher in Germany. On the other hand British workers on temporary contracts have 
a much higher chance of ending up in nonparticipation. 
Transition rates to permanent jobs are slightly higher in Britain than in Germany, especially 
towards the end of the 1990s. The stay rate in temporary employment is comparable to that in 
Germany. 
Durations of unemployment spells 
The data in the BHPS and the GSOEP provide us with information on unemployment spells. 
Only information on completed spells of unemployment will be used. 
For the BHPS we have 2437 spells of unemployment that started after the first interview date 
in 1991 and were completed before the last interview date. These unemployment spells have a 
mean duration of about six and a half months and a median duration of about three and a half 
months. When previous work experience is taken into account, marked differences are 
revealed between workers with a ‘flexible’ employment history and workers with a more 
stable employment pattern. Workers that have had a temporary job in the three years prior to 
the unemployment spell on average have a two months shorter unemployment spell. A 
temporary job directly previous to the unemployment spell does not seem to add to this effect. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
In Germany, 6069 completed spells of unemployment that started after the interview date in 
1991, were registered. On average these spells last longer (about two and a half months) than 
those in Great Britain. In Germany too, workers with a flexible past see their unemployment 
spells reduced considerably. However, the difference is slightly smaller than in Great Britain. 
A temporary job does, again, not seem to further reduce the length of the following 
unemployment spell. People that had a spell of nonemployment (nonparticipation, education, 
etc.) directly prior to their unemployment spell seem to experience shorter than average 
unemployment spells in Germany, whereas in Great Britain, these spells tend to be longer 
than average. 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
Results of estimations 
Introduction 
As mentioned before, several empirical specifications could be used to estimate the duration 
of spells of unemployment, but a choice was made for a model with a fully flexible 
(nonparametric) baseline hazard. This model was developed by Prentice & Gloeckler (1978) 
and is easily estimated in Stata with a routine provided by Jenkins (1995). The model also 
estimates extended models that allow for unobserved heterogeneity as proposed by Meyer 
(1990), but for reasons mentioned earlier, the analysis in this paper is restricted to the ‘simple’ 
model. Another reason not to add an unobserved heterogeneity term is that the labour history 
variables used in the model specification are likely to pick up a substantial part of any 
unobserved heterogeneity. Robustness checks are performed to see whether this assumption is 
valid. 
Models are estimated for Germany and Great Britain for men and women separately. The 
main focus is on variables that characterise the labour history of the individual worker. That is 
the main reason why we don’t specify a competing risks model. The interest is mainly in what 
happened before the unemployment spell (and its influence on the duration of 
unemployment), rather than on what happens after the unemployment spell. For checking the 
robustness of the assumption of ‘no competing risks’ we have estimated competing risks 
models as well.  
Estimation of the Prentice/Gloeckler model involves estimating a baseline hazard for each 
time period an individual is in unemployment. We restricted the analysis by redefining all 
unemployment spells longer than 3 year (36 months) as ‘longer than three years’, represented 
by the duration of 37. Even then the results of estimation contain a large number of 
coefficients, so for reasons of conciseness, only the coefficients for the covariates are 
presented in this paragraph. The complete results of parameter estimations for the flexible 
baseline hazard can be found in Appendix A. 
Germany 
For Germany the results for men do not differ a great deal from the results for German 
women. Older men are less likely to leave unemployment but at a decreasing rate. Marriage is 
significantly increasing the hazard rate out of unemployment for men but not for women. 
Having access to other financial resources as denoted by the variable Other household income 
does reduce the exit rate out of unemployment for both men and women, but not significantly. 
The presence of a small child (younger than six years of age) does significantly reduce the 
hazard rate out of unemployment for both men and women. Education (measured in years of 
education) does increase the hazard rate out of unemployment, again for both men and 
women.  Previous experience in a temporary job does not influence the hazard rate 
significantly. Experiences of unemployment however, do significantly reduce the exit rate, 
and thus increase the duration of unemployment. Previous experience in permanent 
employment increases the exit rate for women, but not significantly. A temporary job directly 
prior to the spell of unemployment reduces the hazard rate out of unemployment, but only for 
men. This is the reverse effect of what the theory predicted. The duration of the previous spell 
of employment has no significant effect on the hazard rate. This is contrary to the 
expectations of the theory presented earlier. Non-native German men have a lower exit rate 
out of unemployment and thus experience longer unemployment spells, this is less 
significantly so for non-native German women. When we look at the dummy variables for the 
‘duration effects’ (Appendix A), it is easily seen that the hazard rate out of unemployment 
decreases with duration for every next period has a significantly negative effect. But we can 
observe smaller negative effects at duration of 12 and 24 months, an indication that benefit 
exhaustion contributes to a higher (but still negative) exit rate out of unemployment. See 
appendix for Table A1 also that includes parameter estimates for the dummy variables that 
represent the flexible baseline 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
 
Great Britain 
For Great Britain the results are not dramatically different compared to those for Germany. 
Older men are less likely to leave unemployment but at a decreasing rate and the same applies 
for older women in Great Britain. Marriage is significantly increasing the hazard rate out of 
unemployment for both men and women. The presence of a small child (younger than six 
years of age) does not influence the hazard rate significantly. Having access to other financial 
resources as denoted by the variable Other household income does significantly increase the 
exit rate out of unemployment for men but not for women. Education (denoted by dummies 
for different levels of educational attainment) does not influence the hazard rate out of 
unemployment a great deal, apart from the positive effect of O level qualifications for men.  
Previous experience in a temporary job does influence the hazard rate for neither men nor 
women. Experiences of unemployment however, do significantly reduce the exit rate, and 
thus increase the duration of present unemployment, for both men and women. Previous 
experience in permanent employment does not significantly influence the exit rate. A 
temporary job directly prior to the spell of unemployment also has no significant effect. The 
duration of the previous spell of employment has a positive effect on the hazard rate out of 
unemployment for both men and women. Ethnicity is a nonsignificant factor for the hazard 
rate out of unemployment in Great Britain.  Not surprisingly, a higher level of unemployment 
has a negative effect on the hazard rate, thus prolonging spells of unemployment significantly 
for both men and women. When we look at the dummy variables for the ‘duration effects’ for 
the British case, it is easily seen that there is no systematic relation between the hazard rate 
out of unemployment and the duration of unemployment. None of the dummy variables 
(except the last one, obviously) are significantly influencing the hazard rate. This could 
indicate that the British system of unemployment benefits is less prone than the German one 
to have an effect on the exit rate out of unemployment, which was to be expected given the 
much less generous nature of the British unemployment benefit system. Again see appendix 
for Tables A3 and A4 that include coefficients for the dummy variables. 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
Comparing the two countries and explaining the differences 
The major differences between Great Britain and Germany could already be observed by 
looking at the descriptives. German unemployment spells are more numerous and tend to last 
longer than their British counterparts. This hardly comes as a surprise since it is a well known 
macroeconomic fact that unemployment in Great Britain is considerably lower than in 
Germany. The straightforward explanation for that is that Great Britain’s labour market is less 
regulated in terms of obstacles for hiring and firing and a less generous system of 
unemployment benefits. 
But given these differences, the impact of the variables used in this paper on the duration of 
unemployment (or rather, the hazard rate out of unemployment) shows some remarkable 
similarities. The quadratic age function has a similar shape and size for both countries, for 
both men and women. This is not surprising given earlier results from empirical literature on 
unemployment durations (e.g. Böheim & Taylor (2000)). 
The effect of marriage is positive in both countries, but in Germany only for men. It is not 
straightforward to give an explanation for this from the institutional setting described earlier. 
But it could be the case that German women still tend to withdraw from the labour market 
after marriage (or child birth).  
The presence of a small child is only significant in Germany. This could be due to the fact 
that the benefit system in Germany is more lenient towards workers with caring obligations 
for (small) children.  
Other household income does reduce the hazard out of unemployment in Germany. The 
finding for Great Britain could suggest that the British system of unemployment benefits is 
more individualised but this is obviously not the case. 
The effect of education is difficult to compare between the two countries since it is measured 
differently. For Great Britain information is available on educational attainment level whereas 
in Germany better information is available on the number of years of schooling. In Germany 
the negative effect on the hazard rate of extra years of schooling might have something to do 
with higher educated worker experiencing more difficulty finding a suitable job. That this 
effect cannot be found for Great Britain is probably due to stricter eligibility rules for 
unemployment benefits and the lower replacement rates that are offered. 
Previous temporary work experience does not influence the hazard rate out of unemployment 
for both workers in Great Britain and in Germany. This is in contrast with the predictions 
from theory. But why doesn’t this mechanism work? The fact that this does not seem to 
happen might be due to the fact that the dummy for ‘Temporary work in the three years prior 
to unemployment spell’ captures some of the unobserved heterogeneity between workers. 
Previous spells of unemployment tend to prolong the current spell of unemployment in both 
countries for both men and women. This ‘stigma’ or ‘scarring’-effect seems to be universal. 
Experience in permanent jobs tends to increase the hazard rate out of unemployment only in 
Germany and only for female workers. This could be a reversed ‘stigma’ effect. The finding 
that this does apparently not occur for in Britain and for German men is slightly puzzling. 
A temporary job directly prior to a spell of unemployment should theoretically shorten the 
spell because of on the job search during the temporary job. In fact the results show no such 
thing: German men tend to have lower hazard rates out of unemployment after temporary jobs 
and for German women and unemployment spells in Great Britain we find no effect. This 
suggests quite strongly that the promotion of temporary work to reduce unemployment is a 
hazardous (sic) policy. Combined with the inherently higher probability of unemployment, 
the finding that the duration of the spell of unemployment is not reduced, will potentially 
result in higher unemployment levels. 
The duration in the previous job variable shows significantly positive effects on the hazard 
rate, but only for Germany. This is again, contrary to theoretical expectations. The fact that 
longer labour market experience increases the chances for a job in general is probably 
dominating the effect of the higher benefit entitlements.  
Only in Germany we find that non-native workers (men, in particular) have longer 
unemployment spells. 
When we compare the result of the dummy variables in the specification, we can clearly see 
that duration dependence is only present in Germany. It seems reasonable to conclude that the 
relatively (compared to Great Britain) generous benefit system and the overall higher levels of 
unemployment can be blamed for that finding.  
Robustness checks 
To test whether the results found in the preceding paragraphs hold up under different 
assumptions and different econometric specifications a number of robustness checks have 
been performed. First of all, in recognition of the fact that unemployment spells do not 
necessarily end in employment but could also end in inactivity, competing risks specifications 
are estimated. Furthermore, to types of specifications (Model 1a with fully flexible baseline 
and Model 2a with logarithmic baseline) are used for the baseline hazard and  where 
computationally viable we also estimated specifications with an ‘unobserved heterogeneity’ 
term (Models 2a and 2b respectively) to check whether the results found in the earlier results 
(Tables 7 and 8) could be attributed to unobserved individual differences. Separate analyses 
are done for men and women. The results are presented in Appendix B. 
The results turn out to be rather robust in many aspects. The main finding, that temporary 
work prior (either directly or in the preceding three years) to an unemployment spell does not 
lead to shorter unemployment spells, is found in all of the specifications, even for the 
unemployment spells that end in inactivity. The only significant result in all of the 
specifications  was a negative impact of a temporary job directly prior to the spell of 
unemployment on the hazard rate out of unemployment to employment for German men. This 
is consistent with the finding in the specification presented earlier (see Table 7). 
In general not many differences can be found between the specifications in- or excluding an 
unobserved heterogeneity term. Where inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity was 
computationally feasible, it turned out not to be significant. This would imply that the set of 
explanatory variables chosen for the explanation of unemployment duration is rather 
adequate. 
From the results in Appendix B it is also confirmed that duration dependence is only relevant 
for the German labour market. In the logarithmic specifications the duration effect ‘Log of 
duration’ turns out to be significantly negative, which is consistent with the findings for the 
fully flexible specifications.  
In general the results for the British data seem somewhat less robust than the results for the 
German data, which comes as no surprise given the considerably lower number of 
observations on unemployment spells in Britain over the 1991-2001 period. 
In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the results presented in paragraph 6.6  are robust 
findings that do not change considerably  when another econometric specification is chosen. 
Summary, conclusions, and further research 
In this paper we have analysed unemployment duration among men and women in Great-
Britain and Germany in the 1990s using appropriate and nationally representative data sets, 
the British Household Panel Survey and the German SOcioEconomic Panel, respectively.  
The data show that unemployment is much more prevalent in Germany and median duration 
of unemployment spells, at 6 months, is longer than in Great Britain, where it is 3.5 months. 
Much of the duration differential could be attributed to previous labour market experience, 
particularly in temporary employment. On average workers with previous experience in 
temporary work tend to have shorter spells of unemployment in both Germany and Great-
Britain in accordance with the theories presented in this paper. 
A multivariate analysis in a discrete time independent competing risk framework with flexible 
baseline hazard rates was used to test these results. These suggest that marked differences 
exist between the German and British labour market. Firstly, the estimated baseline hazard 
rates suggest that duration dependence is much more important for unemployment spells in 
Germany than in Great-Britain. This is probably due to the more extensive unemployment 
benefit system in Germany.  
Of equal importance to policy makers is the impact of previous unemployment experience. 
Secondly, for both countries, unemployment durations are clearly influenced by previous 
labour market history and especially with previous unemployment. This holds for both 
countries under investigation in this paper. The common finding that unemployment tends to 
repeat itself is once again confirmed. 
Thirdly, parameter estimates for the indicators of prior temporary employment are found to 
have very little impact on the exit rates from unemployment for both men and women in both 
Germany and Great-Britain. Experience in temporary jobs should theoretically enable the 
worker to experience shorter spells of unemployment, especially when the temporary job is 
directly prior to this spell. 
The results suggest that flexible labour market policies to reduce unemployment by 
embracing temporary work are potentially counterproductive in the sense that they will result 
in an increase in the number of spells of unemployment. Spells of unemployment that are just 
as long as ‘normal’ spells of unemployment. This could lead to a higher unemployment rate 
on the aggregate level, the opposite of what is aimed for by labour market flexibilisation 
policies.  
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Table 1 – Temporary jobs in Great-Britain 
(Percentage of employees, 1991-2001) 
Total  Year Permanent 
temporary 
No. of observations 
1991 87.91 12.09 5400 
1992 89.24 10.76 5110 
1993 88.69 11.31 5033 
1994 87.43 12.57 5069 
1995 87.49 12.51 5005 
1996 86.66 13.34 5164 
1997 87.47 12.53 5235 
1998 88.47 11.53 5991 
1999 90.59 9.41 8223 
2000 91.50 8.50 8249 
2001 91.29 8.71 9947 
Source: BHPS, 1991-2001 
 
Table 2 – Temporary jobs in Germany 
(Percentage of employees, 1991-2001) 
Year Permanent Total temporary No. of observations 
1991 89.47 10.53 7355 
1992 88.89 11.11 6834 
1993 89.17 10.83 6600 
1994 89.33 10.67 6484 
1995 85.19 14.81 6678 
1996 85.81 14.19 6435 
1997 85.19 14.81 6238 
1998 85.41 14.59 6786 
1999 84.02 15.98 6646 
2000 85.83 14.17 11416 
2001 84.84 15.16 9730 
Source: GSOEP, 1991-2001 
 Table 3 Yearly transition probabilities (%) from temporary job in year t in Great Britain 
      
Year 
t+1 
Non 
Part. 
Unemp. Temporary Permanent No. of observations 
Year t      
1991 33.16 4.04 43.94 18.86  594 
1992 30.43 3.80 47.28 18.48 552 
1993 27.09 4.43 45.49 23.00  587 
1994 31.39 4.29 40.31 24.01 583 
1995 24.23 5.19 44.42 26.15  520 
1996 30.27 3.96 42.16 23.60  555 
1997 15.96 3.15 51.76 29.13  539 
1998 14.32 3.91 44.14 37.63  768 
1999 16.05 4.88 41.11 37.96  922 
2000 16.27 3.35 46.05 34.33 836 
Source: BHPS, 1991-2001 
 
Table 4 Yearly transition probabilities (%) from temporary job in year t in Germany 
      
Year 
t+1 
Non 
Particip. 
Unemp. Temporary Permanent No. of observations 
Year t      
1991 9.70 5.91 48.94 35.45 1134 
1992 7.71 8.45 49.12 34.73 1077 
1993 8.44 10.80 47.01 33.76 1102 
1994 8.09 8.69 56.47 26.75 1013 
1995 7.38 10.75 54.17 27.69 1246 
1996 6.06 11.11 57.24 25.59 1188 
1997 7.55 11.45 56.13 24.86 1231 
1998 7.73 7.80 55.94 28.52 1371 
1999 9.31 9.17 54.93 26.60 1440 
2000 11.23 8.25 51.21 29.31 2146 
Source: GSOEP, 1991-2001 
 
 
Table 5 Duration of unemployment with different ‘flexible careers’ (in months), Great-Britain 
 Temporary job directly prior 
to unemployment spell 
 
Permanent job directly prior 
to unemployment spell 
Other spell prior to 
unemployment spell 
Te
m
po
ra
ry
 jo
b 
 
in
 la
st
  
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
Mean: 5.17 months 
 
Median: 3.02 months 
 
N=439 
Mean: 4.86 months 
 
Median: 2.56 months 
 
N=135 
Mean: 5.86 months 
 
Median: 3.52 months 
 
N=174 
N
ot
 a
 te
m
po
ra
ry
  
jo
b 
in
 th
e 
la
st
 
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
 Mean: 6.44 months 
 
Median: 3.39 months 
 
N=1021 
Mean: 8.70 months 
 
Median: 4.80 months 
 
N=578 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
Mean:  6.62 months 
 
Median:3.55 months 
 
N=2347 
Source: BHPS, own calculations 
 
Table 6 Duration of unemployment with different ‘flexible careers’ (in months), Germany 
 Temporary job directly 
prior to unemployment spell 
Permanent job directly prior 
to unemployment spell 
Other spell prior to 
unemployment spell 
Te
m
po
ra
ry
 jo
b 
 
in
 la
st
  
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
Mean: 7.90 months 
 
Median: 5 months 
 
N=1105 
 
Mean: 7.26 months 
 
Median: 4 months 
 
N=270 
Mean: 7.20 months 
 
Median: 5 months 
 
N=475 
N
ot
 a
 te
m
po
ra
ry
  
jo
b 
in
 th
e 
la
st
  
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
 Mean: 9.92 months 
 
Median: 6 months 
 
N=2096 
Mean: 9.40 months 
 
Median: 6 months 
 
N=2123 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
Mean: 9.04 months 
 
Median: 6 months 
 
N=6069 
Source: GSOEP, own calculations 
 
Table 7: Germany, Discrete time proportional (PGM) hazard model  
(effects on hazard rate out of unemployment, z-values in parentheses) 
Significance levels: ***: 1% ; **: 5% ; *: 10% 
    
Variables Men  Women 
    
Age -0.086 
(7.330)*** 
 -0.102 
(7.710)*** 
Age squared 0.001 
(4.700)*** 
 0.001 
(5.250)*** 
Married 0.230 
(3.270)*** 
 0.036 
(0.480) 
Child younger than 6 yrs -0.264 
(3.120)*** 
 -0.249 
(2.450)** 
Other HH income 0.000 
(1.450) 
 0.000 
(0.200) 
Years of schooling 0.029 
(2.580)** 
 0.035 
(2.540)** 
Temp. job in last 3 yrs -0.026 
(0.330) 
 0.020 
(0.220) 
Unemp. In last 3 yrs -0.833 
(8.480)*** 
 -0.950 
(8.760)*** 
Perm. job in last 3 years -0.058 
(0.870) 
 0.108 
(1.460) 
Temp. prior to unemp. -0.256 
(3.290)*** 
 0.053 
(0.640) 
Duration of prev. empl. 0.000 
(0.140) 
 0.000 
(0.170) 
Non-native -0.333 
(4.240)*** 
 -0.166 
(1.750)* 
Level of unemployment 0.035 
(1.460) 
 0.017 
(0.660) 
    
Number of observations 15937  15975 
Log likelihood (-0.5*Deviance) -4187.983  -3731.42 
 
 
Table 8: Great Britain, Discrete time proportional (PGM) hazard model  
(effects on hazard rate out of unemployment, |z|-values in parentheses) 
Significance levels: ***: 1% ; **: 5% ; *: 10% 
 
Variables Men  Women 
    
Age -0.062 
(3.190)*** 
 -0.061 
(2.380)** 
Age squared 0.001 
(2.490)** 
 0.001 
(1.940)* 
Married 0.500 
(3.900)*** 
 0.314 
(2.210)** 
Child younger than 6 yrs 0.115 
(0.900) 
 -0.052 
(0.340) 
Other household income 0.000 
(2.310)** 
 0.000 
(1.400) 
Degree or above -0.016 
(0.080) 
 -0.305 
(1.130) 
Teaching, nursing or other higher qualif. -0.111 
(0.660) 
 -0.062 
(0.260) 
A level 0.134 
(0.780) 
 -0.236 
(0.960) 
O level 0.332 
(1.930)* 
 -0.177 
(0.820) 
Other qualif. -0.145 
(0.710) 
 -0.238 
(0.950) 
Temp. job in last 3 yrs 0.088 
(0.540) 
 -0.014 
(0.070) 
Unemp. In last 3 yrs -0.793 
(4.260)*** 
 -0.702 
(2.880)*** 
Perm. job in last 3 years 0.050 
(0.440) 
 -0.028 
(0.200) 
Temp. prior to unemp. -0.074 
(0.470) 
 -0.010 
(0.060) 
Duration of prev. Empl. 0.000 
(2.590)** 
 0.000 
(2.260)** 
Non-native -18.395 
(0.000) 
 -0.949 
(1.270) 
Unemployment level -0.205 
(6.330)*** 
 -0.113 
(2.970)** 
    
Number of observations 4518 2517 
Log likelihood (-0.5*Deviance)  -1268.82 
 
 -840.518 
 
 
Appendix I: Parameter estimations of flexible baseline 
Table AI-1: Discrete time proportional (PGM) hazard model (effects on hazard rate out of unemployment, z-values in parentheses) 
 Great Britain Germany 
Dummy variables (month of unemployment spell) Men Women Men Women 
     
d1 -0.101 
-(0.380) 
-0.068 
-(0.170) 
-0.598 
-(3.970) 
-0.445 
-(3.000) 
d2 0.280 
(1.100) 
0.342 
(0.880) 
-0.660 
-(4.220) 
-0.798 
-(4.830) 
d3 0.514 
(2.020) 
0.056 
(0.140) 
-0.708 
-(4.400) 
-0.845 
-(4.900) 
d4 0.273 
(0.990) 
-0.433 
-(0.980) 
-0.785 
-(4.680) 
-1.250 
-(6.220) 
d5 0.082 
(0.280) 
0.301 
(0.730) 
-0.805 
-(4.640) 
-1.200 
-(6.030) 
d6 0.308 
(1.090) 
-0.070 
-(0.160) 
-0.890 
-(4.850) 
-0.971 
-(5.090) 
d7 0.475 
(1.640) 
0.479 
(1.150) 
-1.228 
-(5.990) 
-0.915 
-(4.800) 
d8 0.442 
(1.480) 
-0.233 
-(0.480) 
-0.925 
-(4.830) 
-0.743 
-(4.020) 
d9 0.512 
(1.690) 
0.498 
(1.120) 
-0.851 
-(4.400) 
-0.572 
-(3.190) 
d10 -0.124 
-(0.320) 
-0.281 
-(0.520) 
-0.737 
-(3.870) 
-0.815 
-(4.060) 
d11 0.261 
(0.740) 
-0.474 
-(0.830) 
-0.942 
-(4.470) 
-0.985 
-(4.500) 
d12 0.181 
(0.480) 
-0.070 
-(0.130) 
-0.412 
-(2.240) 
-0.454 
-(2.450) 
d13 0.064 
(0.160) 
0.525 
(1.100) 
-0.630 
-(3.100) 
-0.668 
-(3.240) 
d14 -0.530 
-(0.980) 
-0.929 
-(1.170) 
-0.593 
-(2.860) 
-0.601 
-(2.850) 
d15 -1.146 
-(1.550) 
-1.590 
-(1.490) 
-1.144 
-(4.480) 
-0.952 
-(3.830) 
d16 0.524    -0.840 -0.793 -1.195
(1.390)    -(1.050) -(3.380) -(4.260)
d17 0.632 
(1.630) 
-0.853 
-(1.070) 
-1.335 
-(4.530) 
-0.729 
-(3.040) 
d18 0.246 
(0.540) 
-0.263 
-(0.390) 
-0.954 
-(3.670) 
-0.691 
-(2.880) 
d19 0.383 
(0.890) 
0.330 
(0.580) 
-1.010 
-(3.720) 
-0.843 
-(3.170) 
d20 0.039 
(0.070) 
-0.115 
-(0.170) 
-1.143 
-(3.760) 
-1.100 
-(3.560) 
d21 -0.680 
-(0.930) 
-0.116 
-(0.170) 
-1.199 
-(3.830) 
-0.869 
-(3.100) 
d22 0.300 
(0.560) 
1.029 
(1.960) 
-1.064 
-(3.610) 
-0.508 
-(2.040) 
d23 -17.737 
-(0.010) 
0.552 
(0.820) 
-0.915 
-(3.120) 
-0.592 
-(2.170) 
d24 -1.131 
-(1.110) 
-0.456 
-(0.430) 
-0.901 
-(3.060) 
-0.262 
-(1.070) 
d25 -0.408 
-(0.550) 
-0.333 
-(0.310) 
-1.391 
-(3.710) 
-0.558 
-(1.990) 
d26 0.036 
(0.060) 
-17.990 
(0.000) 
-1.235 
-(3.470) 
-1.040 
-(2.960) 
d27 -0.890 
-(0.870) 
-0.259 
-(0.240) 
-0.626 
-(2.190) 
-1.330 
-(3.160) 
d28 -0.950 
-(0.930) 
-17.920 
(0.000) 
-1.101 
-(3.100) 
-1.322 
-(3.120) 
d29 -0.718 
-(0.700) 
-18.017 
(0.000) 
-1.399 
-(3.290) 
-0.714 
-(2.140) 
d30 0.650 
(1.310) 
-18.051 
(0.000) 
-0.889 
-(2.510) 
-0.921 
-(2.490) 
d31 -0.866 
-(0.850) 
-0.079 
-(0.070) 
-0.661 
-(2.120) 
-0.352 
-(1.180) 
d32 -17.696 
-(0.010) 
-17.964 
(0.000) 
-0.690 
-(2.030) 
-0.659 
-(1.770) 
d33 -17.607 
-(0.010) 
0.475 
(0.600) 
-0.543 
-(1.670) 
-0.506 
-(1.450) 
d34 -0.520 
-(0.510) 
-0.034 
-(0.030) 
-0.495 
-(1.520) 
-0.240 
-(0.750) 
d35 -17.674 
-(0.010) 
-17.865 
(0.000) 
-0.758 
-(1.910) 
-0.805 
-(1.910) 
d36 0.222 
(0.300) 
-17.928 
(0.000) 
-0.564 
-(1.510) 
-0.515 
-(1.310) 
d37 1.528 
(3.510) 
1.929 
(3.450) 
1.651 
(8.630) 
1.257 
(6.210) 
     
Number of observations 4518 
 
2517 
 
15932  15975
 
Appendix II: Results of competing risks estimation 
Table AII-1: Competing risks hazard regressions for unemployment duration, Men, BHPS data 1991-2001 (effects on hazard rate out of unemployment, z-values in 
parentheses) 
         Model 1a:
With fully flexible 
Baseline (NUH) 
Model 1b:
With fully flexible 
Baseline (WUH) 
Model 2a:
With logarithmic 
Baseline (NUH) 
Model 2b:
With logarithmic 
Baseline (WUH) 
             To employment To
inactivity 
To
employment 
 To
inactivity 
To
employment 
 To
inactivity 
To
employment 
 To
inactivity 
Log of duration ♣  ♣  ♣      -0.043 
-(0.650) 
0.163 
(1.190) 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Age           -0.076 
-(2.760) 
-0.030
-(0.400) 
*
* 
*
* 
-0.075 
-(2.830) 
-0.063 
-(0.860) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Age squared 0.001 
(2.090) 
         0.000 
(0.340) 
*
* 
*
* 
0.001 
(2.150) 
0.001 
(0.760) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Married           0.524
(3.000) 
-0.041 
-(0.100) 
*
* 
*
* 
0.509 
(2.910) 
0.013 
(0.030) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Child younger than 6 
years in household 
-0.007 
-(0.040) 
         0.739 
(1.760) 
*
* 
*
* 
-0.005 
-(0.030) 
0.614 
(1.530) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Other household income 0.000   
 (1.650) 
     0.000
(0.120) 
  *                *  * 
* 
0.000 
(1.510) 
0.000 
(0.030) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Degree or above 0.071 
(0.250) 
         0.253 
(0.390) 
*
* 
*
* 
0.075 
(0.260) 
0.349 
(0.540) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Teaching, nursing or 
other higher qualif. 
-0.159 
-(0.680) 
         -0.059 
-(0.100) 
*
* 
*
* 
-0.173 
-(0.740) 
0.066 
(0.110) 
* 
* 
*
* 
A level 0.193 
(0.820) 
         0.892 
(1.400) 
*
* 
*
* 
0.166 
(0.710) 
0.951 
(1.500) 
* 
* 
*
* 
O level 0.123 
(0.530) 
         0.900 
(1.580) 
*
* 
*
* 
0.073 
(0.320) 
1.018 
(1.800) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Other qualif. -0.058 
-(0.210) 
         -0.704 
-(1.000) 
*
* 
*
* 
-0.092 
-(0.330) 
-0.609 
-(0.870) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Temporary job in last 3 
years 
0.039 
(0.200) 
         0.068 
(0.120) 
*
* 
*
* 
0.039 
(0.200) 
0.155 
(0.290) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Unemployed in last 3 
years 
-0.567 
-(2.350) 
         -0.781 
-(1.620) 
*
* 
*
* 
-0.619 
-(2.570) 
-0.856 
-(1.820) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Standard job in last 3 yrs 0.181 
(1.180) 
         0.089 
(0.280) 
*
* 
*
* 
0.159 
(1.040) 
0.129 
(0.420) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Temporary job directly  
prior to unemployment 
-0.141 
-(0.670) 
            -0.056
-(0.110) 
*
* 
*
* 
-0.138
-(0.660) 
0.054
(0.110) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Duration of previous  
employment 
0.000 
(1.960) 
         0.000 
(0.210) 
*
* 
*
* 
0.000 
(1.920) 
0.000 
(0.190) 
* 
* 
*
* 
Belongs to ethnic group -18.492 
(0.000) 
              (dropped) *
* 
*
* 
-15.293
-(0.010) 
(dropped) *
* 
*
* 
Unemployment level -0.134 
-(2.860) 
         -0.330
-(2.660) 
* 
* 
*
* 
-0.126 
-(2.750) 
-0.358
-(2.910) 
* 
* 
*
* 
                
Unobserved 
heterogeneity term 
               
Number of observations                2361 1180 2361 1180
♣ Complete parameter estimations for flexible baseline available upon request 
 
Table AII-2: Competing risks hazard regressions for unemployment duration, Women, BHPS data 1991-2001 (effects on hazard rate out of unemployment, z-values in 
parentheses) 
         Model 1a:
With fully flexible 
Baseline (NUH) 
Model 1b:
With fully flexible 
Baseline (WUH) 
Model 2a:
With logarithmic 
Baseline (NUH) 
Model 2b:
With logarithmic 
Baseline (WUH) 
         To
employment 
 To
inactivity 
To
employment 
  To
inactivity 
To
employment 
 To
inactivity 
To
employment 
 To inactivity 
Log of duration ♣  ♣  ♣     0.021 
(0.250) 
0.126 
(0.770) 
0.022 
(0.270) 
0.217 
(1.270) 
Age       -0.037 -0.056
-(0.830) -(0.570) 
* 
* 
*
* 
-0.038 
-(1.200) 
-0.101 
-(1.120) 
-0.040 
-(1.610) 
-0.057 
-(1.650) 
Age squared 0.000 
(0.630) 
     0.001 
(0.390) 
* 
* 
*
* 
0.000 
(0.810) 
0.001 
(0.860) 
0.000 
(1.090) 
0.001 
(0.900) 
Married      0.361 0.115
(1.860) 
 
(0.260) 
* 
* 
*
* 
0.331 
(1.710) 
0.140 
(0.340) 
0.351 
(1.810) 
0.301 
(0.720) 
Child younger than 6 years  
in household 
-0.021 
-(0.100) 
     -0.109 
-(0.220) 
* 
* 
*
* 
-0.060 
-(0.310) 
0.025 
(0.050) 
-0.078 
-(0.390) 
0.180 
(0.360) 
Other household income 0.000 
(0.730) 
     0.000 
(0.690) 
* 
* 
*
* 
0.000 
(0.790) 
0.000 
(0.760) 
0.000 
(0.740) 
0.000 
(0.440) 
Degree or above -0.291 
-(0.730) 
     -0.892 
-(0.980) 
* 
* 
*
* 
-0.264 
-(0.670) 
-0.801 
-(0.910) 
-0.239 
-(0.610) 
-1.008 
-(1.390) 
Teaching, nursing or other higher 
qualif. 
0.041 
(0.120) 
     -0.067 
-(0.080) 
* 
* 
*
* 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.111 
(0.140) 
0.013 
(0.040) 
-0.115 
-(0.170) 
A level 0.086 
(0.260) 
     -1.406 
-(1.600) 
* 
* 
*
* 
0.031 
(0.100) 
-1.447 
-(1.700) 
0.040 
(0.120) 
-1.602 
-(2.110) 
O level 0.098 
(0.330) 
     -1.250 
-(1.470) 
* 
* 
*
* 
0.110 
(0.380) 
-1.326 
-(1.580) 
0.095 
(0.330) 
-1.536 
-(2.230) 
Other qualif. 0.069 
(0.200) 
     -1.719 
-(1.760) 
* 
* 
*
* 
0.038 
(0.110) 
-1.424 
-(1.510) 
0.042 
(0.120) 
-1.966 
-(2.330) 
Temporary job in last 3 years 0.326 
(1.230) 
     -0.174 
-(0.280) 
* 
* 
*
* 
0.319 
(1.240) 
-0.362 
-(0.610) 
0.333 
(1.290) 
-0.288 
-(0.480) 
Unemployed in last 3 years -0.950 
-(2.530) 
 -0.824 
-(1.590) 
* 
* 
 * 
* 
 -0.794 
-(2.180) 
 -0.871 
-(1.750) 
-0.782 
-(2.140) 
-1.026 
-(1.930) 
Standard job in last 3 yrs -0.388 
-(2.030) 
 0.087 
(0.210) 
* 
* 
 * 
* 
 -0.379 
-(2.040) 
 0.079 
(0.190) 
-0.359 
-(1.870) 
0.080 
(0.190) 
Temporary job directly  
prior to unemployment 
-0.244 
-(1.140) 
 -0.246 
-(0.490) 
* 
* 
 * 
* 
 -0.208 
-(0.990) 
 -0.122 
-(0.250) 
-0.243 
-(1.140) 
-0.242 
-(0.460) 
Duration of previous  
employment 
0.001 
(2.840) 
 0.000 
(0.850) 
* 
* 
 * 
* 
 0.001 
(3.090) 
 0.000 
(0.480) 
0.001 
(3.070) 
0.000 
(0.370) 
Belongs to ethnic group -0.429 
-(0.420) 
 -1.456 
-(1.180) 
* 
* 
 * 
* 
 -0.373 
-(0.360) 
 -1.263 
-(1.070) 
-0.347 
-(0.340) 
-1.615 
-(1.370) 
Unemployment level -0.159 
-(2.740) 
 0.021 
(0.170) 
* 
* 
 * 
* 
 -0.135 
-(2.590) 
 -0.019 
-(0.150) 
-0.131 
-(3.140) 
-0.105 
-(1.130) 
               
Unobserved heterogeneity term             -15.210 
-(0.110) 
-14.777 
-(0.030) 
                
Number of observations 1185  655      1185  655  1185  655 
♣ Complete parameter estimations for flexible baseline available upon request 
 
Table AII-3: Competing risks hazard regressions for unemployment duration, Men, GSOEP data 1991-2001 (effects on hazard rate out of unemployment, z-values in 
parentheses) 
 Model 1a: 
With fully flexible 
Baseline (NUH) 
 Model 1b: 
With fully flexible 
Baseline (WUH) 
 Model 2a: 
With logarithmic 
Baseline (NUH) 
 Model 2b: 
With logarithmic 
Baseline (WUH) 
 To 
employment 
 To 
inactivity 
 To 
employmen
t 
 To 
inactivity 
 To 
employme
nt 
 To 
inactivity 
 To 
employme
nt 
To inactivity 
Log of duration ♣  ♣  ♣    -0.070 
-(2.290) 
 0.304 
(4.350) 
-0.065 
-(2.060) 
0.306 
(4.000) 
Age -0.104 -0.123 
-(7.440) 
 
-(4.310) 
-0.105 
-(8.270) 
 * 
* 
 -0.114 
-(8.150) 
 -0.162 
-(5.750) 
-0.115 
-(5.140) 
-0.162 
-(4.960) 
Age squared 0.001 
(5.460) 
 0.001 
(3.400) 
0.001 
(6.040) 
 * 
* 
 0.001 
(6.280) 
 0.002 
(4.670) 
0.001 
(3.960) 
0.002 
(5.240) 
married 0.288 -0.068 
(3.580) 
 
-(0.430) 
0.290 
(3.600) 
 * 
* 
 0.272 
(3.350) 
 -0.078 
-(0.500) 
0.274 
(3.350) 
-0.077 
-(0.430) 
Child younger than 6 years  
in household 
-0.274 
-(3.040) 
 0.042 
(0.160) 
-0.269 
-(2.980) 
 * 
* 
 -0.234 
-(2.600) 
 -0.024 
-(0.090) 
-0.229 
-(2.480) 
-0.027 
-(0.100) 
Other household income 0.000 
-(0.790) 
 -0.002 
-(1.300) 
0.000 
-(0.780) 
 * 
* 
 0.000 
-(0.480) 
 -0.002 
-(1.330) 
0.000 
-(0.470) 
-0.002 
-(1.300) 
Years of schooling 0.029 
(2.330) 
 0.042 
(1.640) 
0.030 
(2.410) 
 * 
* 
 0.023 
(1.880) 
 0.034 
(1.300) 
0.024 
(1.910) 
0.034 
(1.170) 
Temporary job in last 3 years -0.025 
-(0.280) 
 -0.131 
-(0.670) 
-0.027 
-(0.310) 
 * 
* 
 -0.009 
-(0.100) 
 -0.076 
-(0.400) 
-0.011 
-(0.120) 
-0.091 
-(0.440) 
Unemployed in last 3 years -0.730 
-(6.870) 
 -1.683 
-(6.060) 
-0.727 
-(6.860) 
 * 
* 
 -0.658 
-(6.320) 
 -1.156 
-(4.540) 
-0.654 
-(6.210) 
-1.147 
-(4.470) 
Standard job in last 3 yrs -0.012 
-(0.160) 
 -0.438 
-(2.640) 
-0.016 
-(0.210) 
 * 
* 
 -0.010 
-(0.140) 
 -0.196 
-(1.200) 
-0.013 
-(0.180) 
-0.193 
-(1.100) 
Temporary job directly  
prior to unemployment 
-0.242 
-(2.800) 
  -0.295
-(1.520) 
-0.252 
-(2.900) 
 * 
* 
 -0.224 
-(2.590) 
 -0.328 
-(1.690) 
-0.234 
-(2.680) 
-0.339 
-(1.520) 
Duration of previous  
employment 
-0.002 
-(0.960) 
 0.004 
(1.030) 
-0.002 
-(0.940) 
 * 
* 
 -0.002 
-(0.780) 
 0.005 
(1.230) 
-0.002 
-(0.720) 
0.005 
(1.260) 
Belongs to ethnic group -0.330 
-(3.680) 
 -0.405 
-(2.230) 
-0.341 
-(3.780) 
 * 
* 
 -0.354 
-(3.950) 
 -0.287 
-(1.640) 
-0.365 
-(4.040) 
-0.285 
-(1.480) 
Unemployment level 0.047 
(1.680) 
 0.144 
(2.520) 
0.051 
(1.870) 
 * 
* 
 0.011 
(0.430) 
 0.016 
(0.320) 
0.014 
(0.330) 
0.015 
(0.230) 
                
Unobserved heterogeneity term           -13.784 
-(0.440) 
 -15.246 
-(0.150) 
-15.981 
. 
                
Number of observations 10918  4753  10918       10918  4753  10918 4753
♣ Complete parameter estimations for flexible baseline available upon request 
 
Table AII-4: Competing risks hazard regressions for unemployment duration, Women, GSOEP data 1991-2001 (effects on hazard rate out of unemployment, z-values 
in parentheses) 
 Model 1a: 
With fully flexible 
Baseline (NUH) 
 Model 1b: 
With fully flexible 
Baseline (WUH) 
 Model 2a: 
With logarithmic 
Baseline (NUH) 
 Model 2b: 
With logarithmic 
Baseline (WUH) 
 To 
employment 
 To 
inactivity 
 To 
employment 
 To 
inactivity 
 To 
employment 
 To 
inactivity 
 To 
employment 
To inactivity 
Log of duration ♣  ♣  ♣    -0.037 
-(1.050) 
 0.361 
(5.390) 
* 
* 
0.363 
(5.220) 
Age -0.123 -0.075 
-(7.310) 
 
-(2.880) 
-0.122 
-(5.190) 
 * 
* 
 -0.134 
-(7.800) 
 -0.147 
-(5.530) 
* 
* 
-0.149 
-(6.790) 
Age squared 0.001 
(5.450) 
 0.001 
(1.510) 
0.001 
(3.940) 
 * 
* 
 0.001 
(6.130) 
 0.001 
(4.160) 
* 
* 
0.001 
(5.180) 
married 0.071 -0.018 
(0.770) 
 
-(0.120) 
0.068 
(0.710) 
 * 
* 
 0.095 
(1.030) 
 0.025 
(0.170) 
* 
* 
0.019 
(0.130) 
Child younger than 6 years  
in household 
-0.259 
-(2.250) 
 -0.027 
-(0.120) 
-0.254 
-(2.120) 
 * 
* 
 -0.261 
-(2.260) 
 -0.015 
-(0.060) 
* 
* 
-0.057 
-(0.240) 
Other household income 0.000 
(1.510) 
 0.000 
-(0.630) 
0.000 
(1.520) 
 * 
* 
 0.000 
(1.460) 
 0.000 
-(0.520) 
* 
* 
0.000 
-(0.520) 
Years of schooling 0.032 
(2.010) 
 0.045 
(1.570) 
0.031 
(1.470) 
 * 
* 
 0.026 
(1.570) 
 0.035 
(1.200) 
* 
* 
0.034 
(1.330) 
Temporary job in last 3 years 0.043 
(0.410) 
 -0.117 
-(0.610) 
0.046 
(0.430) 
 * 
* 
 0.032 
(0.310) 
 -0.042 
-(0.220) 
* 
* 
-0.043 
-(0.230) 
Unemployed in last 3 years -0.809 
-(6.430) 
 -1.463 
-(6.380) 
-0.802 
-(6.200) 
 * 
* 
 -0.713 
-(5.810) 
 -1.090 
-(5.080) 
* 
* 
-1.082 
-(4.990) 
Standard job in last 3 yrs 0.073 
(0.840) 
 0.202 
(1.360) 
0.080 
(0.880) 
 * 
* 
 0.074 
(0.850) 
 0.288 
(1.970) 
* 
* 
0.293 
(1.920) 
Temporary job directly  
prior to unemployment 
-0.006 
-(0.060) 
 0.162 
(0.960) 
-0.012 
-(0.110) 
 * 
* 
 0.034 
(0.340) 
 0.217 
(1.320) 
* 
* 
0.223 
(1.350) 
Duration of previous  
employment 
0.000 
(0.190) 
 -0.002 
-(0.460) 
0.001 
(0.240) 
 * 
* 
 0.001 
(0.240) 
 -0.001 
-(0.190) 
* 
* 
-0.001 
-(0.210) 
Belongs to ethnic group -0.111 
-(0.920) 
 -0.274 
-(1.610) 
-0.107 
-(0.860) 
 * 
* 
 -0.118 
-(0.990) 
 -0.244 
-(1.450) 
* 
* 
-0.240 
-(1.470) 
Unemployment level 0.034 
(1.060) 
 0.022 
(0.440) 
0.032 
(0.840) 
 * 
* 
 0.003 
(0.090) 
 -0.088 
-(1.940) 
* 
* 
-0.083 
-(1.490) 
Unobserved heterogeneity term             -14.985 
-(0.070) 
-15.901 
. 
                
Number of observations 10405  5437        10405 10405  5437 5437 
♣ Complete parameter estimations for flexible baseline available upon request 
